Movin' on now...no, really.

[muckefuck]

Why did I struggle to formulate a reply to Mr Seat-Warmer when James Lileks had already done it?

I am struck once again by the incomparable hold VIETNAM has over some people. They don’t seem to realize how the use of this inapt example demonstrates their inability to grasp the nature of new and different conflicts. When I was in college, El Salvador was Vietnam. When I was in Washington, Kuwait was Vietnam. Afghanistan was briefly Vietnam when we hadn’t won the war after a week. It’s Warholian: in the future, all conflicts will be Vietnam for 15 minutes.

Vietnam was an anomaly. Vietnam was perhaps the least typical war we’ve ever fought, but somehow it’s become the Gold Standard for wars – because, one suspects, it became inextricably bound up with Nixon, that black hole of human perfidy, and it coincided with the golden glory years of so many old boomers who now clog the arteries of the media and academe. A gross overgeneralization, I know. But it’s a fatal conceit. If you’re always fighting the last war you’ll lose the next one. Even worse: Vietnam was several wars ago.

Every time I discuss the current conflict with a boomer, I know they're going to bring up Vietnam. It's utterly predictable and inevitable. It was so refreshing to hear the naysayers in Afghanistan bring up the British invasion for a change. At last! A germane comparison instead of the same old hammer being brought out again to pound yet another pointy thing that looks strikingly like a nail if you happened to be in college in the late 60's or early 70's.

Comments

[arkanjil.livejournal.com]

Vietnam left a large memetic footprint, and one that wasforiegn to our collective experience beforehand. It left a pretty strong impression that way, something kin to how the civil war pressed certain concepts down for generations. Of course, we are as a culture pretty much chuckleheads when it comes to the actual meaning behind history.

One reason why I think it gets trotted out is that there are few other situations that are equvielant, and none on that scale. such makes for an easy shorthand, fitting a wide variety of doomsday scenarious. And such is just stock in trade; after all, there are far too pundints on any side of the coin these days that try making a sincere play for our colective intelligence... alas.

[muckefuck.livejournal.com]

You say that Vietnam was "foreign to our collective experience". What about Korea? What made it so strikingly different? The fact that South Vietnam was overrun? That there were no large-scale protests against Korea?

Well, in a nutshell

[arkanjil.livejournal.com]

we lost.

Well, there are lots of other niggly things, like the relative low age of our servicemen vs how old they'd been in WW2 and Korea, the guerella nature of the war, the indifference/hostility of the natives, and the lack of clear deliniation between the Good Guys and the Bad Guys- we thought ill enough of several south vietnamese presidents to have them sacked. Vietnam was kinda special.

Relavent, tho? Overall, no, but there are certian elements I dearly wish Shrub had paid more attnetion to in history class.

All together class: 'Q' is for Quagmire....

[muckefuck.livejournal.com]

Arguably, we lost Korea as well. If Saddam was "unfinished business", what do we call Kim Jong Il?

Re: Well, in a nutshell

[lhn.livejournal.com]

Well, there are lots of other niggly things, like the relative low age of our servicemen vs how old they'd been in WW2 and Korea

What do you think is the significance of the soldiers' ages?

(On the other hand, in WWII, Korea, and Vietnam, the soldiers were overwhelmingly draftees. This may be a bigger difference between Iraq and any of those previous wars.)

the guerella nature of the war

How often do guerrillas actually win wars, though? Particularly without support from an outside great power?¹ The guerrillas in Vietnam were smashed pretty much beyond reconstitution years before the war ended; it was the regular troops of the NVA that rolled over the South.

¹The Sadrist militia does appear to have Iranian support. I submit that we're capable of putting pressure on Iran that we weren't capable of putting of the Soviets in the Vietnam era.

the indifference/hostility of the natives

No war but Vietnam has involved indifferent or hostile elements among the population of the countries we've invaded? How is that different from WWII or Korea or the Spanish-American War or the Civil War or...?

and the lack of clear deliniation between the Good Guys and the Bad Guys

Unlike, say, WWII, where we knew that Stalin was a Good Guy and the Finns were Bad Guys? Vietnam may have had significant elements that weren't common to other wars that we've fought and won, but I'm not sure that these are them.

Nutshell redux

[arkanjil.livejournal.com]

Age, I think, translates into alack of experience in general, especially with the dealings and travails of life and death and living. The average age in Vietnam was 19, while it was something like 25 or so for WW2. Those troops were, i would propose, less prepared emotionally and socially for the situations that they faced. (One of the issues in today's Iraqi situation (to me) is that the troops are for the most part also 19-23, even up to the frontline leaders. Such may well be more inclined, i feel, to shoot first, ask questions later, which would in turn lead to situations that excarabate the raw emotions between the occupiers and the occupied.) The issue of all volunteer vs draftees is interesting, tho i cant see how it affects the current day, other than the troops might be more 'dedicated.' The issue about how the reserves are being treated is a big one, tho I heard tonight that military reenlistment rates are still high.

The gueralla thing really is more about the nature of the oppenent faced rather than how often that style wins. By their nature, guerellas are much scarier and demoralizing than regular troops to face- you never know who they are, or how and when they will strike. Vietnam was the first wide scale war where we faced such opponents in masses- I don't think the Viet Kong ever fielded a formal troop line as such until the end. And yes, while the gueralla force got pounded into the dirt and almost never won a strategic victory, thier tactical value was huge. Ho Chi Minh said something like all we can do is throw bodies at them until they sicken of it. If you pay that price, it does work: Algeria, Lebannon, and Afghanistan are examples, to name a few.

Outside money is another key ingrediant tho, and def, the Sadrists (among others) are getting money and support from outside; I've read reports on the ground of men driving around rebel held areas in big cars with cash and weapons to hand out as needed. Probably Iranians, tho I would put no bets that such an operation would get any manner of formal approval from the heads of thier governement, or even from the mullahs (collectively). It could well be the Syrians tho, or even the Saudis, those sneaky devils. Or all of them; given how many would love to see the US get our nose bloodied, there are probably carpet baggers all over the country...

The hostility point is iffy, and more elaborately is based also in the communication issues between our troops and the populace. With Europeans during ww2, there was some cultural resnance, and a fair number of english speakers. In korea, the general populace was historiclly subservient and also grateful to be having thier fat pulled out of the fire, and the troops were facing enemy troops wearing uniforms. Vietnam, however, had a populace that had been through generations of war, and were often bullied and worse by both the Viet Kong and the South Vietnamese troops- and occasionaly by us. Worse, the enemy hid among the populace, which sowed no great love between us and the folks: who could be trusted? Thats one thing that Vietnam and Iraq have in common that we did not face before- an oppenent unwilling to fight us in the open by the common rules of war, and willing to use most any means neccesasry. Thats what i mean by the lack of deliniation between sides. I would hope that the majority of iraqis are not anti US, but there are many stories coming out of Iraq about collateral casualties.

In Iraq, we've avoided fraternization as best we could, for reasons both good and bad. The Iraqis are not subserviant peasants such as the Vietnamese often were, and of course most everyone in the country is armed to start with...

I really don't consider the Korean conflict a loss; we met the objective that we set, and probably couldn't have done better at the time, given the circumstances. in no other place until Vietnam did we lose the objective. KJII- hurrrr; don't get me started.

Anyways- hope this all makes some manner of sense; i'm terrible about being able to articulate clearly

Re: Nutshell redux

[lhn.livejournal.com]

The gueralla thing really is more about the nature of the oppenent faced rather than how often that style wins. By their nature, guerellas are much scarier and demoralizing than regular troops to face- you never know who they are, or how and when they will strike.

I'm not sure about "scarier and [more] demoralizing". By all accounts, the sudden, unavoidable death of artillery or aerial bombing is pretty hellish. It may have been called combat fatigue or shell shock rather than PTSD, but the psych problems of WWII soldiers were pretty severe. (The WWII vets just weren't as inclined to make movies about them.)

Vietnam was the first wide scale war where we faced such opponents in masses

Are you not counting the conquest of the Philippines? Why not? We invented the Colt .45 for that conflict, because the .38 was inadequate for stopping the enemy, specifically the fanatical Muslim guerrillas (the Moros). We won. (Whether we should have fought it is another question.)

Ho Chi Minh said something like all we can do is throw bodies at them until they sicken of it. If you pay that price, it does work: Algeria, Lebannon, and Afghanistan are examples, to name a few.

Afghanistan, like Vietnam, required superpower backing and training to field that force. Algeria took place against a France exhausted and shamed by WWII and demoralized by its loss Southeast Asia, where there was no strategic value to keeping colonies and diminishing interest in empire. Likewise, our reasons for being in Lebanon were comparatively weak, and the cost of pulling out apparently low. (Since the cost of our actions in Lebanon and Somalia arguably included 9/11, this is debatable, but that wasn't on the radar at the time.)

On the other hand, as noted above we won in the Philippines and held onto them for decades, until we let them go on our own terms. Likewise, the Boer guerrillas failed to keep the British from taking South Africa, the original Spanish guerrillas were inadequate to keep Napoleon out of Spain, the French resistance never pushed the Germans out of France.

The mere presence of some irregular fighters isn't itself a sign of inevitable defeat. Even the Germans had their Werewolves, to cause problems after the war had formally ended. Part of the question is the scale. As far as I can tell, there were more VC killed by the US in an average year of Vietnam than the total number of Mahdi militiamen. That could get worse for us, but it could also get better.

The hostility point is iffy, and more elaborately is based also in the communication issues between our troops and the populace. With Europeans during ww2, there was some cultural resnance, and a fair number of english speakers.

I don't think we were welcomed into Germany except insofar as they were relieved not to be under the Soviets instead. Speaking of difficulty telling friend from foe, our first landings across the Atlantic in WWII involved fighting French shore batteries in Morocco. (Language skills and cultural resonance weren't adequate to tell us their loyalties vis a vis Vichy.) Nor did our style of war generally lack for collateral damage in allied countries.

In korea, the general populace was historiclly subservient and also grateful to be having thier fat pulled out of the fire, and the troops were facing enemy troops wearing uniforms. Vietnam, however, had a populace that had been through generations of war, and were often bullied and worse by both the Viet Kong and the South Vietnamese troops- and occasionaly by us. Worse, the enemy hid among the populace, which sowed no great love between us and the folks:

I think you overestimate Korean gratitude and subservience, and underestimate the working of the same sorts of forces as in Vietnam. Kim Il-Sung started as a guerrilla against the Japanese. We massacred civilians for fear of guerrillas at No Gun Ri. Nor were those fears unfounded: as it happens, the last communist guerrilla to be captured by the South Koreans just died. She wasn't caught till 1963. But South Korea is still there (NK artillery permitting) and the guerrillas aren't.

Re: Nutshell redux

[mollpeartree.livejournal.com]

It may have been called combat fatigue or shell shock rather than PTSD, but the psych problems of WWII soldiers were pretty severe. (The WWII vets just weren't as inclined to make movies about them.)

So true. I once read an account of a WWII battle in which GIs were pinned down in foxholes on some benighted beach in the Pacific and bombarded from the air for over a month; %80 of U.S. casualties from that one were psychological. You almost never hear stuff like this about the "good war," though.

[zompist.livejournal.com]

Unfortunately, Lileks's comment isn't a reply either, just a bit of chronological snobbery.

With each war, the US begins by attempting to correcting any mistakes in the last one, and of course making entirely new mistakes. Thus after WW2 it was believed that appeasement was Always Bad, and so we had to oppose communism wherever it occured, with some successes (Korea, Berlin), some surface successes that became failures later (Guatemala, Iran, Afghanistan), some frankly bad ideas (Vietnam, the Congo). After Vietnam it was felt that wars had to be short and not risk domestic discontent; thus we had hard-to-lose spectacles (Grenada) and the Gulf War. After the Gulf War it was felt that we had to finish what we'd begun and not get bogged down with allies who didn't want us to go too far: thus the Iraq War.

There are many obvious differences from Vietnam: our technological edge is a lot more overwhelming; the strategic stakes are more engaging (the potential for a democratic Iraq is enormous; the strategic import of a communist Vietnam turned out to be small); a professional army is very unlikely to tear apart domestic politics; the US isn't trying to prop up a local dictator but (mirabile dictu) to establish a federal republic; Ho Chi Minh was just not the villain Saddam Hussein was.

On the other hand, difficult questions don't go away just because we faced them 40 years ago in a war we'd like to forget. Granted that we have to fight large international antidemocratic movements, are bigger guns all it takes to win the fight? Does pretending that there's a pro-American government ready to take over mean that there is one? If we can't convince the new Iraqi army to fire on its own citizens, are we going to do the firing ourselves, or just leave and let the thugs take over? "Boomers boomers boomers" is not an answer to these questions.

[mollpeartree.livejournal.com]

My current fear with the Vietnam analogy, though, (apart from the sheer self-fulfilling defeatism of it) is that there is one very destructive message I think people might be preparing to lift from it. Boomers have very nearly collectively sanctified themselves for causing the American pull-out from Vietnam; if you bring up how that may have been the best likely outcome under the circumstances for the U.S., but was pretty horrible for the South Vietnamese (not to mention Cambodia), the answer is "Well, the U.S. should never have been there in the first place, so that isn't our fault." If you consider how much success in Iraq may ultimately be a matter of will and commitment, then it's clear that a similar willingness to reject corporate and ongoing responsibility for the outcome of U.S. military intervention is one possible disastrous consequence of a change of administration. Kerry vacillates between "we broke it, we have to fix it" and "what a mess they have gotten us into", depending on the day of the week, apparently. Beating down the Vietnam analogy until it is dead and lying in the gutter strikes me as a very good idea right now.

(I'm not ignoring your comment in the earlier thread, btw; I find I want to go off on a number of tangents in talking about it, but the home computer is needed for actual paying work right now, so I can't write much of anything substantive until the weekend).

[muckefuck.livejournal.com]

I think you miss my point, zompist. If someone raises any of those substantive questions, then they deserve a thoughtful answer. "This reminds me of Vietnam" isn't a substantive question; it's a bit of nostalgia. As such I don't think it demands any more reply than, "Iraq is not Vietnam. Get over it." Show me you've done a bit more thinking about the parallels and contrasts and then we can talk.

[snowy-owlet.livejournal.com]

In a shocking turn of events, I agree with you.